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Since the collapse of the Cold War system, issues on human rights 
have come to the fore in a wide range of areas and have turned into major 
agenda item in international relations as ever before.(1) For example, 
the 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action emphasized that 
“the promotion and protection of human rights is a matter of priority for 
the international community.”(2) In particular, such a trend is markedly 
obser ved in a current ef for t to set up an international jurisdiction 
concerning serious violations of human rights in armed conﬂict. This was 
inspired by the atrocities committed in the course of the wars in the former 
Yugoslavia and by the Rwandan genocide in the ﬁrst half of 1990s.
In July 1998, the Rome Statue establishing the International Criminal 
Court was adopted at the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries. More than 160 states sent delegates to this conference, 
and 120 of them voted for the Statute, 7 against and 21 abstained.(3) The 
establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) has been often 
described as a culmination of the history of human rights development 
since the Second World War.(4) A major motivation behind it was the desire 
for a permanent body capable of dealing with grave breaches of human 
rights rules which “deeply shock the conscience of humanity”(5) such as 
those committed in Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia, Sierra Leone, East 
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Timor, Cambodia, Iraq and so on.(6) Serious violations of human rights rules 
and norms—including international humanitarian law such as the 1949 
Geneva Conventions—are now seen as threats to the “peace and security 
and well-being of the world.”(7) That the serious violation of human rights 
constitutes a threat to international peace and security has been repeatedly 
reafﬁrmed in the UN Security Council resolutions concerning the incidents 
in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda.(8) In these resolutions, the Security 
Council determined that the situations in the former Yugoslavia or in 
Rwanda where widespread violations of international humanitarian law 
including mass killings and ethnic cleansing have occurred constitute a 
“threat to international peace and security.”
One commentator notes that “[s]everal landmark events . . . indicate 
an emerging consensus on the need to put an end to impunity for 
international crimes.”(9) Respect for human rights is, in other words, an 
unavoidable tide in the contemporary world, and no state can readily ignore 
the rules and norms.(10) Among others, massive human rights atrocities 
committed in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and the following estab-
lishments of ad hoc international criminal tribunals dealing with these 
atrocities had a signiﬁcant impact on international politics and came to be 
precedents for similar attempts such as in Sierra Leone, Cambodia and 
East Timor.
Why has the international community moved to adopt an institution 
of international criminal justice to respond to human rights atrocities, and 
what kind of role it can play in restoring peace in post-conﬂict societies? 
This paper will discuss the theoretical implications of international criminal 
justice system in a broad sense with regard to the debates on human rights 
protections and peace-building after conﬂicts.
2. Human Rights Law and State Sovereignty
The concept of human rights has so wide a range of meaning that 
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there is no philosophical consensus on the content of the term of human 
rights.(11) In principle, the concept of human rights stems from care for 
humanity,(12) and is recognized in a variety of international agreements 
as one of several fundamental values for the contemporary international 
community. For example, the preamble to the 1948 Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights states that, in the ﬁrst place, “recognition of the inherent 
dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human 
family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.”(13) 
Donnelly describes that “[w]e have human rights not to what we need for 
health but to what we need for a life of dignity.”(14) Freeden deﬁnes human 
rights as follows: “a human right is a conceptual device, expressed in 
linguistic form, that assigns propriety to certain human or social attributes 
regarded as essential to the adequate functioning of a human being; 
that is intended to serve as a protective capsule for those attributes; and 
that appeals for deliberate action to ensure such protection.”(15) From a 
political point of view, as seen in Freeden’s deﬁnition above, human rights 
are moral and legal instruments for people to claim for human dignity 
against their own states. Donnelly also states that human rights are “the 
social and political guarantees necessary to protect individuals from the 
standard threats to human dignity posed by the modern state and modern 
markets”(16) and also “setting universal criteria of political legitimacy.”(17)
It seems to be useful here to see a brief history of international 
documents on human rights, which would tell us how people have tried 
to crysterize care for humanity and the “conscience of humanity”(18) and 
create a more “humane” world order. In the modern world, the codifi-
cation of the concept of human rights at the international level began in 
the nineteenth century with concern for slavery, the treatment of sick 
and wounded soldiers and prisoners of war, the treatment of aliens, the 
condition for workers, and so forth.(19) With the end of the First World War, 
the Covenant of the League of Nations, which was stipulated as Part I of the 
Treaty of Versailles, included provisions based on care for humanity: calling 
the member states for making a “fair and humane conditions of labour for 
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men, women and children”(20) and securing “just treatment of the native 
inhabitants of territories under their control.”(21)
After the Second World War, many frameworks of human rights 
rules were set up under the United Nations system. First, the Charter of 
the United Nations sets forth as one of its purposes of an achievement 
of international co-operation in promoting and encouraging respect for 
human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction 
as to race, sex, language, or religion.(22) All member states of the United 
Nations are required to take action in order to achieve this purpose.(23) 
Second, based on the human rights values expressed in the Charter, the 
UN General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
in 1948. Later in 1966, two human rights conventions were concluded in 
order to bring the idea embodied in the earlier Declaration into legally 
binding rules: namely, the International Convention on Civil and Political 
Rights and the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights.(24) In order to secure the state compliance with these treaties, they 
established implementation and enforcement mechanisms. Subsequently, 
the international community has concluded a number of international 
treaties and conventions whose fundamental values were derived from 
the Declaration and aimed at complementing two Conventions. Since it is 
not within the scope of this paper to look into every convention, sufﬁce it 
here to refer that the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide was signed in 1948 and states that “genocide, whether 
committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international 
law.”(25) Third, it should be briefly noted that international humanitarian 
law, or the law of war, which would be applied in the time of war or armed 
conﬂict, has also developed: namely, the Hague and Geneva Conventions. 
Although it is acknowledged that international humanitarian law categori-
cally on the distinct lineage from human rights norms which are to be 
applied in the “time of peace,” it is obviously another process of codifying 
care for humanity.
The international community has made many attempts to implement 
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these human rights and humanitarian rules onto societies, and created 
many organs in the UN system in charge of their implementations. 
For example, the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and its 
subsidiary commissions and committees have issued numerous reports, 
recommendations, and draft conventions on human rights for the UN 
General Assembly. Furthermore, most treaties and conventions mostly 
require state parties to take certain measures in order to implement 
provisions, and also establish a certain system of monitoring them.(26) The 
Commission on Human Rights and its sub-commission have, among others, 
been authorized to examine information, study situations and take action 
with respect to complaints about human rights violations.(27) However, the 
competences of these implementing and monitoring bodies are profoundly 
limited: no more than requiring states parties to take certain measures, 
to make periodical reports, or proclaiming their violations of conven-
tions. Besides, although there are many reasons which hinder effective 
implementation of human rights provisions, one of main difﬁculties comes 
from the fact that human rights are, as deﬁned above, political devices to 
regulate the relationship between individuals and state power. This leads 
to the premise that the issue of human rights has been primarily seen as 
a subject falling within the domestic jurisdiction of each sovereign state, 
where other political authorities are required to refrain from interfering in 
internal affairs.(28)
This is a logical consequence derived from the principles of the 
sovereign quality of all states and of non-intervention afﬁrmed in the UN 
Charter(29) and other international documents.(30) Moreover, in some cases, 
states could take measures derogating from their obligation under the 
convention in time of public emergency.(31) MacKinnon states that this is 
a “formal excuse from compliance.”(32) As often discussed concerning the 
issue of humanitarian intervention after the Cold War, especially in the 
case of Kosovo, there is considerable tension between protecting human 
rights and respecting conventional principles of international law.(33) It 
is widely argued among scholars of international law that the concepts 
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of sovereignty and non-intervention under international law have been 
“subject to a process of reinterpretation in the human rights ﬁeld [ . . . ] so 
that states may no longer plead this rule as a bar to international concern 
and consideration of internal human rights situations.”(34) However, this is 
not deﬁnitive and is still open to dispute.(35) One of the initial motivations of 
the creation of international tribunals is to put an end to impunity for those 
who responsible for serious violations of human rights, if not all cases.(36)
Therefore, although having made great contributions to the devel-
opment of human rights protection, the existing human rights protection 
system is, on the whole, unable to deal adequately and effectively with 
violations of human rights in the contemporary world, and much less to 
punish those who responsible for the abuses and bring people to accom-
modation.(37)
3. International Criminal Tribunals
The current effort to create ad hoc international criminal tribunals 
aims at overcoming the insufﬁciency of existing human rights protection 
mechanisms. It is also one way to achieve transitional justice in post-conﬂict 
societies.(38) There are two types of such tribunals: (i) international criminal 
tribunal (the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR) which were established by the UN Security 
Council acting under Chapter VII of its Charter), and (ii) special panels 
within the domestic judicial system (so-called “internationalized” or 
“hybrid” courts, tribunals and panels created in Kosovo, Sierra Leone, East 
Timor and Cambodia).
The creation of two ad hoc international criminal tribunals in the 
middle of the 1990s —namely the ICTY and the ICTR —is the ﬁrst attempt, 
since the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, to conduct judicial proceedings 
at an international court against individual perpetrators of international 
crimes during the war by invoking a newly devised concept of ‘crimes 
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against humanity’ and the conventional category of war crimes. Moreover, 
theses two tribunals have been recognized as models for subsequent 
similar institutions. However, there is much criticism concerning the 
establishment of the ICTY, a prototype of subsequent ad hoc tribunals. 
The principal objections can be categorized into three points: (i) the 
Tribunal was established to make up for the impotence of diplomacy and 
politics, illustrated the inability of the international community to find a 
swift and proper solutions to the conﬂict; (ii) by establishing the Tribunal 
the Security Council exceeded its powers conferred by the UN Charter, 
adopting an act that was apparently ultra vires; (iii) in creating a criminal 
court dealing only with crimes allegedly committed in a particular region, 
the Security Council opted for ‘selective justice.’(39) As to the second point, 
what is important here is not whether the Security Council is authorized 
to exercise a certain power that is apparently based on the controversial 
principle of implied power, but the fact itself that the Security Council 
acting under Chapter VII determined that human rights atrocities in the 
former Yugoslavia constituted a threat to international peace and security 
and decided to establish a judicial organ in order to halt further atrocities 
and hold perpetrators to account. To be sure, the Security Council’s 
decision to address the devastating situation by establishing a judicial insti-
tution was a political decision and such a policy option was not envisaged 
when the United Nations was created. However, it can be argued that the 
decision represents a new development in an attempt to respond more 
effectively to human rights atrocities. As Rachel Kerr points out, it is “the 
clearest recognition . . . of the explicit inter-relationship of law and politics 
to serve a common goal,”(40) because, while “[t]he tribunal was created as 
a judicial body to carry out a purely judicial function, [i]ts purpose . . . as 
a measure for the restoration and maintenance of international peace and 
security is essentially political.”(41)
The ICTY and the ICTR are created in different situations from a court 
in a domestic system and even separated from the International Court 
of Justice. The success of their operations hinge on the highly uncertain 
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political contexts: such as funds on the UN General Assembly and the 
supports from states and the Security Council with respect to putting 
pressure on states to comply with its decisions.(42) There is an argument 
as to whether this form of international response to the conﬂict is appro-
priate and effective for the purpose of the restoration and maintenance of 
international peace and security. David Scheffer suggests that international 
judicial intervention could be the “shiny new hammer” for the international 
community to respond to certain types of emergencies in which funda-
mental human rights are at stake.(43) The prevailing view is, however, that 
the establishment of judicial organs was a substitute for forceful interven-
tions, stemming from international public pressure that “something has 
to be done.”(44) In that sense, it is hardly the best policy option, but may be 
much better than doing nothing or intervening with armed forces.
The ad hoc Tribunals have imposed upon them two different obliga-
tions: to law and to politics.(45) They are inherently political or selective by 
virtue of their method of establishment even if they are legitimate judicial 
bodies.(46) Here arises the issue of the function and role of judicial system in 
disputes in which political factors are deeply entwined. Kerr illustrates that 
“where [these obligations] are conﬂictual, which takes precedence? If the 
pursuit of justice is detrimental to the pursuit of peace in the short-term, 
should not the pursuit of peace prevail, since it is the primary object of the 
Tribunal as an institution?”(47)
As to the conﬂict between justice and peace, there is another argument 
about the notion of international justice. William Pfaff criticizes that the ad 
hoc tribunals are based on the Western legal and moral tradition, and have 
legitimacy as long as all parties concerned share the ‘common-sense’ for 
‘speciﬁc justice.’ He argues that the ICTY and the ICTR
have had two major accomplishments: they administer ‘ interna-
tional’ justice and not victor’s justice; and they have established in 
practice their right to indict and try individuals despite the national 
character of the crimes and those individuals’ formal subjection to 
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national sovereignties. These are major steps towards the ideal of 
international jurisdiction and justice in matters of crimes against 
humanity and war crime. These accomplishments are nonetheless 
limited since they rest on an international consensus which could 
prove ephemeral.(48)
He admits, on the other hand, that they might accomplish significant 
achievements in the ﬁeld of international law.
If the existing tribunals do not administer ‘victor’s justice’, they 
nonetheless administer justice as deﬁned by the Western European 
democracies and by Western legal and moral traditions. They are 
effectively functioning within the existing framework of interna-
tional law and conventions which attempt to limit war, and prevent 
or contain international conﬂict. This is a signiﬁcant achievement.(49)
Therefore, generally speaking, it might generate a body of jurisprudence 
that would continue to build over time and influence the development 
of international law in relation to international politics.(50) However, the 
application of Western or “international” rules and norms to non-Western 
cases is still a contentious issue. For example, during the negotiation 
with the United Nations, the Cambodian government rejected a recom-
mendation presented by the UN Group of Experts for Cambodia that 
the United Nations establish an ad hoc international tribunal, like in the 
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, to respond to the atrocities committed 
by the Khmer Rouge leadership.(51) The recommendation was based 
on a conclusion made by the Group of Experts after its investigation in 
Cambodia that the Cambodian judiciary lacked key elements for fair and 
effective trials.(52) The reason for Cambodia’s rejection is that the Report 
of the Group of Experts in which the recommendation was made does not 
“take account of Cambodia’s need for peace and national reconciliation.”(53) 
The government also cautioned that, “if improperly conducted, the trials 
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of Khmer Rouge leaders would create panic among other former Khmer 
Rouge ofﬁcials and rank and ﬁle and lead to a renewed guerrilla war.”(54) 
Faced with the rejection, the United Nations eventually agreed to create a 
“hybrid” tribunal composed of international and local judges and applying 
international and local rules.(55) Consequently, while establishing a judicial 
institution is one of several valuable policy options for responding to human 
rights atrocities, there are many obstacles to it.
4. Truth and Reconciliation Commissions
It should be noted that there is another effort to resolve the contra-
diction between justice and peace, and also fulﬁl international standards, 
a local need for peace and reconciliation, and the pursuit of political goals 
and legal requirements by establishing a quasi-judicial institution such as 
a truth and reconciliation commission. Well-known examples of such an 
effort are commissions established in South Africa, Chile, Argentina, El 
Salvador, Honduras, Uruguay, and Rwanda.
The general purpose of truth and reconciliation commissions is “to 
reveal the truth about the past and to serve as a mechanism for estab-
lishing justice.”(56) The advantages of such an institution are illustrated by 
Cassese. He points out that it could
(i) further understanding in lieu of vengeance, reparation in lieu of 
retaliation, and reconciliation instead of victimization; (ii) promote 
a kind of historical catharsis, through public exposure of crimes; 
(iii) delve into the historical, social, and political roots of the crimes; 
(iv) establish a historical record of the atrocities committed; and 
(v) prevent or render superﬂuous long trials against thousands of 
alleged perpetrators.(57)
It is regarded as one of several effective policy options for responding to 
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human rights atrocities and restoring peace, aiming to bring justice and 
peace into harmony, particularly “when the former government is still 
strong and any major trial for all the persons who orchestrated or ordered 
atrocities would be likely to jeopardize the stability and viability of the new 
democratic government.”(58)
In the Asian context, a commission established in East Timor after its 
independence from Indonesia is a notable example. In July 2001, the United 
Nations Transition Authority in East Timor (UNTAET) established the 
Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor (CAVR 
in its Portuguese acronym).(59) It was originally proposed by East Timorese 
NGOs in a workshop of the National Council of Timorese Resistance in 
June 2000 and subsequently organized in detail with the cooperation of 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UNTAET 
Human Rights Unit, and other international experts.(60) Its main objective is 
to promote national reconciliation by establishing the truth regarding past 
human rights violations committed in East Timor between 25 April 1974 
and 25 October 1999.(61)
There is a fundamental division of labour between the CAVR and other 
formal judicial bodies such as the Serious Crimes Panels(62) and the Ofﬁce 
of the General Prosecutor (OGP). It is expected that, while the formal 
judicial bodies are responsible for prosecuting perpetrators of serious 
human rights violation categorized as ‘serious crimes’ such as war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, rape, and torture, the CAVR deals with ‘less 
serious’ crimes such as looting, burning and minor assault.(63) However, one 
of outstanding characteristics of the CAVR process—Community Reconcili-
ation Process—is its strong connection with the formal judicial process. In 
the course of Community Reconciliation Process, the CAVR should send 
to the OGP a written statement submitted by a person who is responsible 
for the commission of atrocities and wishes to participate in a Community 
Reconciliation Process, and the OGP will decide whether it exercises juris-
diction over his/her acts in the case that they constitute serious criminal 
offences.(64) To be sure, it seems to be a considerable risk for a deponent(65) 
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to come forward, but the CAVR’s ﬁnal report shows that it received over 
1,500 statements in its four-year operation.(66) Although it needs a little 
more time to judge the success of the CAVR’s work, it contributed to 
reveal the truth of human rights atrocities in East Timor between 1974 
and 1999 which includes information on serious criminal of fences.(67) 
Whether the Community Reconciliation Process and the ‘truth’ established 
in the process lead to true reconciliation among people in East Timor and 
Indonesia is another question which requires further investigation and 
analysis. Nevertheless, as one commentator noted, “it is fair to argue that 
the process was not only a Community-based Reconciliation Process, but it 
was indeed a Community-based Justice and Reconciliation Process” and it 
contributed “not only to the reconciliation process . . . but also to the formal 
justice system.”(68)
5. Concluding Remarks
Reconciliation processes do not necessarily result in forestalling 
further atrocities and building a more peaceful community, as justice does 
not always lead to reconciliation. Nonetheless, as Ramsbotham et al. have 
pointed out regarding the South African case, a truth and reconciliation 
commission “of fers a magnificent and hopeful example of a creative 
attempt to handle the past in a way that furthers societal reconciliation in 
the present and promotes conﬂict resolution into the future.”(69) However, 
the relationship between peace, justice and reconciliation is so complicated, 
and there is no ‘one-size-ﬁt-all’ model. In addition, as Cambodian and East 
Timorese cases clearly show, there is a serious contradiction between 
international efforts to achieve the protection of human rights and strong 
resistance from local governments. Nevertheless, as the East Timorese 
and Cambodia cases also show, the international community and local 
communities suffered from the past human rights atrocities have sought a 
way to achieve reconciliation and restore a public order based on the rule 
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of law through judicial and quasi-judicial mechanisms.
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